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Judgments of the European Court 
of Human Rights (the Court) are 
“essentially declaratory in nature, and 
leave to the state concerned the choice of 
the means to be used in its domestic legal 
system for performance of its obligation” 
to abide by the judgment.1 The Court 
has not considered itself competent to 
make recommendations as to which 
steps should be taken to remedy the consequences 
of a violation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) 
2 and had always abstained from 
making any consequential orders or declaratory 
statements, arguing that it falls 
to the Committee of Ministers to supervise 
the execution of its judgments.3 
The Court did not have the power to 
order the respondent State to take specific 
measures in order to remedy the violation, 
unlike the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights which, pursuant to Art. 
63§1 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights, “may rule, if appropriate, 
that the consequences of the measure or 
situation that constituted the breach of [a 
provision of the American Convention] 
be remedied”. 
In numerous cases successful applicants 
have asked the Court to direct the 
respondent state to introduce arguably 
necessary legislative amendments so 
as to bring into conformity with the 
Convention the national law which 
was found to have been at the source 
of a violation.4 Each time the Court 
categorically replied that the Convention 
did not empower it to order the respondent 
state to alter its legislation.5 In Soering 
v the United Kingdom, the applicant 
submitted that just satisfaction of his 
claims would be achieved by effective 
enforcement of the Court’s ruling and 
he invited the Court to give directions in 
relation to the operation of its judgment 
to the respondent government. The Court 
responded that it was not empowered 
under the Convention to give directions 
of the kind requested by the applicant: 
“By virtue of Article 54 [now Article 
46], the responsibility for supervising 
execution of the Court’s judgments rests 
with the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe.”6 
The absence of an injunctive power 
on the part of the Court has often been 
criticised by academics7 and by the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe as not being conducive to 
the proper and rapid execution of 
judgments.8 Gradually the Court has 
itself assumed more responsibility for 
the proper execution of its judgments, 
by giving indications as to what the best 
remedy would be, or by clearly giving 
orders for reparation. 
There were some indications of 
developments in the Court’s approach in 
earlier judgments such as Iatridis v Greece, 
concerning the withdrawal of a cinema 
license, where the Court recommended 
that the best course of action would 
be to give the applicant a new cinema 
license.9 However, the Court has never 
directly pronounced such an order in 
the operative part of the judgment.10 
In the case of Papamichalopoulos and 
others v Greece the Court for the first time 
offered the respondent Government an 
alternative: either to make restitution in 
integrum or to pay compensation for the 
pecuniary damage, within six months. 
This was a “first serious assault on the 
doctrine that the [Court] has no power 
to issue directions to the states in respect 
of the execution of its judgments”.11 
Subsequently, the Court has, in a 
number of property cases, held that the 
respondent state was to return to the 
applicant within a period from three to 
six months, the property concerned.12 
However, it almost always left open an 
alternative for the state in that it ordered 
that, failing restitution, a fixed sum in 
respect of pecuniary damage was to 
be paid to the applicant by way of just 
satisfaction. 
Since 23 October 2003, the Court has 
indicated in more than 60 cases against 
Turkey13 (in which the applicants had 
been convicted by a security court, which 
was found not to be independent and 
impartial within the meaning of Art. 6 
of the Convention) what the respondent 
state must do in order to comply with the 
judgment. For example, in Alfatli v Turkey 
the Court stated, in relation to Art. 41 
that “in principle, the most appropriate 
form of relief would be to ensure the 
applicant in due course a retrial by an 
independent and impartial tribunal”.14 
More precise indications were 
recently given in the case of Assanidze v 
Georgia where the Grand Chamber of 
the Court ordered for the first time an 
applicant’s release at the earliest possible 
date, in addition to the payment of 
just satisfaction for pecuniary damage. 
The Court held that, by its very nature, 
the violation found (the continued 
deprivation of liberty despite the existence 
of a court order for release) did not 
leave any real choice as to the measures 
required to remedy it, in contrast to the 
usual discretion a State enjoys in these 
matters.15 In Ilascu and others v Moldova 
and Russia, the Court ordered the release 
of the arbitrarily detained applicants 
and held that “any continuation of the 
unlawful and arbitrary detention of the 
three applicants would necessarily entail 
a serious prolongation of the violation of 
Art. 5 found by the Court and a breach 
of the respondent States’ obligation under 
Art. 46 §1 of the Convention to abide by 
the Court’s judgment”.16 Moreover, the 
Court stated that “the respondent States 
are to take all necessary measures to put 
an end to the arbitrary detention of the 
applicants still imprisoned and secure 
their immediate release”.17 
Judge Ress is convinced that the 
Court rightly considers that it has the 
inherent power to give such precise 
orders when the respondent state clearly 
has no discretion in the relevant case.18 
According to Steven Greer there are three 
particular advantages to the Court being 
more specific c about the kind of systemic 
action required by national authorities: 
compliance with the judgment is less open 
to political negotiation in the Committee 
of Ministers; it is easier to monitor 
objectively both by the Committee and 
by other bodies such as NGOs and other 
domestic human rights agencies; and 
a failure by relevant domestic public 
authorities to comply effectively is, in 
principle, easier to enforce by both the 
original litigant, and others, through the 
national legal process as an authoritatively 
confirmed Convention violation.19 
 
1 Marckx v Belgium (No. 6833/74), 13/6/79, 
Para. 58. 
2 Barkhuysen, T. & Van Emmerik, M., L., 
“Improving the Implementation of Strasbourg and 
Geneva Decisions in the Dutch Legal Order: Reopening 
of Closed Cases or Claims of Damages Against the State” 
in, T., Christou & J., Raymond (eds) Court Remedies 
and Execution of Judgments, The British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, 2005, p.7. 
3 Polakiewicz, J., “The Execution of Judgments 
of the Court”, in Blackburn, R., & Polakiewicz, J. 
“Fundamental Rights in Europe”, Oxford University 
Press, 2001, p.57. 
4 Ryssdal, R., “The Enforcement System Set 
Up Under the Convention”, eds Bulterman, M., K., & 
Kuijer, M., “Compliance With Judgments of International 
Courts”, The Hague-Boston-London: Nijhoff , 1996, p. 
50. 
5 See Pelladoah v The Netherlands (No. 16737/90) 
22/9/94. 
6 Soering v The United Kingdom (No. 14038/88) 
7/7/89 para.25. 
7 See Cassese, A., International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2002), pp.366-367; Clayton, R., and 
Tomlinson, H., The Law of Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p.1554. 
8 Lambert-Abdelgawad, E., “The Execution of 
Judgments of the Court”, Human Rights Files No.19, 
2003, p.7. 
9 Iatridis v Greece (No. 31107/96) 19/10/00, 
para.35. 
10 Ress, G., “The Effect of Decisions and 
Judgments of the Court in the Domestic Legal Order”, 
Texas International Law Journal, Vol. 40:359, 2005, 
p.372. 
11 Lambert-Abdelgawad, E., “The Execution of 
Judgments of the Court”, Human Rights Files No.19, 
2003, p.27. 
12 See Brumarescu v Romania (No. 28342/95) 
28/10/99. 
13 Vandenhole, W., “Execution of Judgments” in 
Lemmens, P., & Vandenhole, W., (eds) “Protocol No.14 
and the Reform of the Court”, Intersentia, 2005, p.109. 
14 See Alfatli v Turkey (No. 32984/96) 30/10/03, 
Para. 52. 
15 Assanidze v Georgia (No. 71503/01) 8/4/04, 
Para. 202-204 and operative Para. 14(a). 
16 Ilascu and others v Moldova and Russia (No. 
48787/99) 8/7/04, Para. 490. 
17 Ibid, operative Para. 22. 
18 Ress, G., “The Effect of Decisions and 
Judgments of the Court in the Domestic Legal Order”, 
Texas International Law Journal, Vol. 40:359, 2005, 
p.373. 
19 Greer, S., “The Convention, Achievements, 
Problems and Prospects”, Cambridge University Press, 
2006, p.160. 
